255 research outputs found

    Self-managed cells and their federation

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    Future e-Health systems will consist of low-power, on-body wireless sensors attached to mobile users that interact with a ubiquitous computing environment. This kind of system needs to be able to configure itself with little or no user input; more importantly, it is required to adapt autonomously to changes such as user movement, device failure, the addition or loss of services, and proximity to other such systems. This extended abstract describes the basic architecture of a Self-Managed Cell (SMC) to address these requirements, and discusses various forms of federation between/among SMCs. This structure is motivated by a typical e-Health scenario

    Adaptive self-management of teams of autonomous vehicles

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    Unmanned Autonomous Vehicles (UAVs) are increasingly deployed for missions that are deemed dangerous or impractical to perform by humans in many military and disaster scenarios. Collaborating UAVs in a team form a Self- Managed Cell (SMC) with at least one commander. UAVs in an SMC may need to operate independently or in sub- groups, out of contact with the commander and the rest of the team in order to perform specific tasks, but must still be able to eventually synchronise state information. The SMC must also cope with intermittent and permanent communication failures as well permanent UAV failures. This paper describes a failure management scheme that copes with both communication link and UAV failures, which may result in temporary disjoint sub-networks within the SMC. A communication management protocol is proposed to control UAVs performing disconnected individual operations, while maintaining the SMCs structure by trying to ensure that all members of the mission regardless of destination or task, can communicate by moving UAVs to act as relays or by allowing the UAVs to rendezvous at intermittent intervals. Copyright 2008 ACM.Accepted versio

    AC/DC: Adaptive Cutoffs and Disputable Cutoffs for robust critical transactions in smart-contracts

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    To guarantee delivery of their intended functionalities in the presence of unresponsive parties, current smart-contracts cut users off from being able to commit their responses after a fixed period of time has elapsed. However, current blockchains have limited transaction processing capacities, so a fixed amount of time will not always be sufficient to receive every (C-TX). This paper presents a mechanism for adaptive cutoffs (ACs) which ensures that users retain the opportunity to commit despite blockchain congestion, and enables early cutoffs when the number of required is low. A non-interactive argument system for setting adaptive cutoffs under the current Ethereum Virtual Machine is described. Additionally, disputable cutoffs (DCs) are presented, which are a more efficient approach used in parallel to ACs based on a bisection-based dispute. Furthermore, it’s empirically demonstrated that an AC/DC-enabled smart-contract can receive a larger number of than its non-adaptive counterparts when user responsiveness is slowed due to denial of service or congestion

    Ponder: Realising enterprise viewpoint concepts

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    This paper introduces the Ponder language for speciing distributed object enterprise concepts. Ponder, is a declarative language, which permits the specification of policies in terms of obligations, permissions and prohibitions and provides the means for defining roles, relationships and their configurations in nested communities. Ponder provides a concrete representation of most of the concepts of the Enterprise Viewpoint. The design of the language incorporates lessons drawn from several years of research on policy for security and distributed systems management as well as policy conflict analysis. The various language constructs are presented through a scenario for the operation, administration and maintenance of a mobile telecommunication network

    Non-intrusive IP Traceback for DDoS Attacks

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    The paper describes a Non-Intrusive IP traceback scheme which uses sampled traffic under non-attack conditions to build and maintains caches of the valid source addresses transiting network routers. Under attack conditions, route anomalies are detected by determining which routers have been used for unknown source addresses, in order to construct the attack graph. Results of simulation studies are presented. Our approach does not require changes to the Internet routers or protocols. Precise information regarding the attack is not required allowing a wide variety of DDoS attack detection techniques to be used. Our algorithm is simple and efficient, allowing for a fast traceback and the scheme is scalable due to the distribution of processing workload. Copyright 2007 ACM

    Locating Network Domain Entry and Exit point/path for DDoS Attack Traffic

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    A method to determine entry and exit points or paths of DDoS attack traffic flows into and out of network domains is proposed. We observe valid source addresses seen by routers from sampled traffic under non-attack conditions. Under attack conditions, we detect route anomalies by determining which routers have been used for unknown source addresses, to construct the attack paths. We consider deployment issues and show results from simulations to prove the feasibility of our scheme. We then implement our Traceback mechanism in C++ and more realistic experiments are conducted. The experiments show that accurate results, with high traceback speed of a few seconds, are achieved. Compared to existing techniques, our approach is non-intrusive, not requiring any changes to the Internet routers and data packets. Precise information regarding the attack is not required allowing a wide variety of DDoS attack detection techniques to be used. The victim is also relieved from the traceback task during an attack. The scheme is simple and efficient, allowing for a fast traceback, and scalable due to the distribution of processing workload. © 2009 IEEE.Accepted versio

    Network domain entrypoint/path determination for DDoS attacks

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    Accepted versio
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